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THE PRESENT STATE
OF CHINA.
I.

PREI_JIMINARY.

JF it

were not for the mare ur·
gent, and for the mom-ant,
more dangerous problems o£ the
Ruhr and t.he Near East, the Ghancello·r ies of Europe and America
would, at the present time, be very
much exercised in regard to conditions in O:hina. The consensus o£
opinion in well-informed circles is
that never since the establishment
of the Republic, has the situation
in this country been graver, nor the
outlook mor~ ho·pelless, than today.
Financially and politica.Uy, China
appears to be abs6lutely bankrupt.
Treaties and other engagements
are daily being violated by the
Provincia1l Autho'l:ities, and the so~
called Central Government is
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powerle .s in, the £ace o£ their open
defiance. It is sheer wa te of time
for the Legations at Peking to
enter protests. with, and demand
satisfaction from, ~ Ministry o£
Fo·r eign AffairSI which £or weeks on
end has to carry on without a
Minister, and which, even when
there is an occupant of the post,
cannot make a pretence o£ enforc.ing natiorn.all engag~ments.
It is proposed• in this and subsequent articles to place on record,
as briefly as possible, the facts
about the present state of China.
It cann,ot be hoped that thi series
o£ articles wiill be e,x haustive, for
it would require many volumes,
and much more detailed investigation than is possible in a . newspaper office W· give a comprehensive account o£ conditions in each
Province in, thi 1mhappy country.
All that it can he hoped to do is to
give an outline of the situation
today, which may serve as aJ basis
for comparisO'Il at some future
date.
China has been a Republier---hut
a Republic in na.me, only-since
February 1912. From the date on
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which he assumed the Presidency
-March 10, 1912-un,til his death
June 1916, Yuan Shih-kai ruled
the country as a Dicta.tor. ·w ith
the aid of loyal !'llLbordina.tes he was
a1ble, until the last few months of
his life, cru.sh all serio.u s o·p po i tion. From the time o£ his
dea.th, the Central GoveiJ:nment
virtually cea ed to exerci e any
real authority. It has been able
hom time to time, through combinations o£ its military supporters-or more properly, patronsto exercise a shadowy authority
over certain groups o£ provinces.
But there has not sinc.e the death
o£ Yuan Shih-kai been a. President
or a Government, which. could
issue order or instructions a.p plicable to all the Provinces, with the
remotest expectation that they
would, be obeyed.
No time need be wasted here
over tracing, in detail, the rapid
decline of the authority of the eocalled Central Government. It is
necessary £or our purpose on1ly to
look at the results, as· they appear
today. The T 1hree E ·a stern Pwvinoes, since Cihang Tso-lin's
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abortive expedition against tha
Capital in Aprill922, have virtual~
ly severed all relations with tbe
Peking Administration.
Ohang
Tso-lin proclaimed his independenoo after his return to Mukden,
and has defied the Presiden,t, the
Cabinet, and the Foreign Lega...
tions ever since. He has almost
paralysed
the
Peking-Mukden
Railway-the great trunk line
connecting the
Ca~pital
with
Mukden and via Mukden with tlw
Russ1an and Japanese Rat1.way
systems in Siberia1, and South
Manchuri~ . and Korea, re pectiveoly
~by stopping throrugh-traffic on
the Ohihli-Manchuria border, and
canying off and retaining roll.' his
owru use twice the number o£ passenger wag-ons, and neail'ly £our
times the number o£ goods-wagons,
that are required £or no•r mal txaffio
In
outside the Great IWlall.
addition to thiR he stole, and still
retains. over 200 cars belonging to
other Chinese Government lines.
Ouler Mongolia i still in the
hands o£ the Reds. The Northern
and Centrai portions o£ China
y1roper are ccntrolled hy the Chihli
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Militarists, General Tsao Kun at
Paotingfu, and General Wru Pei-fu
n,t Loyang. They, fo·r the moment,
have the P'ekiThg Government at
their meorcy, and though they are
never tired of professions of loya,Jty
to the President and the Cabinet,
their loyalty eonsists of lip-service
'I' hey oii' their prote~Ses
only.
hiB.ve publicly humiliated the President by declinri.ng to permit his
duly appointed nominees to assuane
t.heir posts as Civil Governors of
Hupeh and Kiangsi. They have,
more recently, affronted and humiliated President and Cabinet
by compelling the Governm€nt
to a.p point Mill itary Govel"'lO•r s
o£ their own selection to the Pro.
vinces o£ Fukien and K wangtung
in So·u th Clhina. It was a Paotingfu intrigue which wrecked the last
-the Wang Ohung-hui-Oabinet.
In \Vklste:rn, South-Western and
Southern China extraordinary confusion prevails. Szechuan, Ohina,'s
largest and wealthiest Province,
which has been thie scene o£ almost
incessant civil strife ever since the
death o:f Yuan Shih-kai, is once
more in the throes o£ Oivil War, in
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which Wru Pei-£u is attemp.t ing to
intervene in the hope o£ extending
the influence o£ the Chihli Party.
Yunnan is again .urnlder the control
o£ the ·a mbitious Tang Ohi-yao,
who is also reported to have designs
on Szechuan. Kwangsi has been
in a condition o£ alb solute anarchy
ever since the "conquest" of the
province by a Oantonese· Army
a.bout two years a.go. No-one can
predict. what the next day win
bring forth in Kwangtung. Sun
Yat-sen'~ recent triumphal return
to Canton has no•t , as he expected,
resulted in the collapse o£ tha
opposition militarists, whose attitudes still remain doiUJM£ul.
Chen Chiung-ming, who wa unable, chrefly owing to lack of
fina.n cial resources, to retain his
holn. on Canton, remains a factoc
to be reckoned with. The Peking
Government
has
delibera.tely
af:iron,t ed the Cantonese by appointing Shen Hung-ying as Tuli, or
:Military GoJVernol'. There are continu~us unrest and uncertainty in
Fukien and Kiangsi. And Chekiang has just distinguished itself
by one o£ the mos.t flagrant vio._
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lations, UJp-to-date, of Ohina.'s engagements in regard to the taxation
of foreign goods in the interior.
:Many pn)IVinc.es, including Hona.n•, where General •Wlu Pei-fu
has established h:s headquarters,
al'e in.lested with handits. The
whole country is seething with un~
rest and as i£ its internal condi.
tion' were not serwus
e4nough to
require that every effort he concentrated on reorganiza,t ion, the
inesponsible elements, such as the
students ailld professional politicians, are now engaged upon a deliL·e rate campaign to reneiW the
anti-Japanese boycott-a. campaign
which, if it sucoeellls, will embroil
China with a neighbouring Power
which during tho past twelve
months has given convincing proof
o& its friendly disposition by the
settlement of the Shanrtumg question. Lastly, there is a corrupt
and ab urd Parliament at Peking
whose intermittent sessio'Ils a~re
confined to O'bstruction ()£ the administration, and opposition to
every reasonable pmposaJ £orr the
adjustmenrt of China's foreign re~
la,t ious.
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II

THE C.E:NTRAL GOVBR.NME.NT

UNDER the Manchu Eimpire the
Empl'Ior, who was an absolute
Monarch, the "Son o£ Heaven,"
and responsible to none burt; Heaven
for the governance o£ •hlis realm,
appointed his own nominees as
Vice.roys and Governors o£ the
Provinces, and it was an inexorable
rule tha.t no .Viceroy o·r Governor
might rule over hi native Province. The Viceroy or Gove!rnor,
however, was, in turn, an a.utocrat.
in the Provit.ees or Province over
which he ruled, and as long as he
remitted his quota o£ rervenues or of
trihute to PeJiing, and there wme
no erious clisturbances in the territOiy under his jurisdiction, ·h e
enjoyed a very large mea ure of
independence during his tenure of
]'orce o£ circum~tances
office.
compelled the Throne to assert its
authority in JCiOinnection · with
China,' 'foreioon relations; and during 1he last year o£ the Dyna ty
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there was a tendency tOJWards greater centralization in rega.r d to
military affairs and coiiLIUunications. It "\Via•s, it may :be tecalled,
the assertion of Imperial a.urt;hority
in connection with Ghina's trunk
railways, that was the main factor
in bringing a,.bOtUt the First Revolution.
Under the Reptl blic the rule
that no ()official might hold office
in his own p10vince was immediately cancelled. And it. is to~day the .
rule, rather than the exception,
for the officiaJs of all kinds and
grades to be natives of the ProviniCe ill which they function. An
iron hand was required, in these
cn-cumstances, to maintain even
the semblance of the Central Government' ~ authrority. Ancl though
that authority was maintained by
frnrce or hy intrigue, a long a
Yuan Shih-kai lived, no orther
Preside,nil: of t.he Chinese Re.p ublio
has exercised any real control over
the whole countly. 'l'he jealousies
o£ the militarists, and the disrupting influences of incessant civil
strife, have so reduiCed the pre tige
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of the SOl-called Central Government that, a.t the moment, it is a
Government merely in name, incapable of enforcing its o:rders in
any part of the co•l mtry. It is no
longer practical politics to urge t.he
establishment of a strong centralized
administration.
Wha.t ever
solution may eventually be found
f<JT China's internal difficulties, a
laxge measure of provincial autonomy will have to be conceded. It
is imperative, .neveQ"thelef>s, that
the authority of the Gentral GoveTnment should be restored in connect.i on with Ohina's foreign relations, the co•n trol of the Chinese
armies, and the collection of certa.:in revenues, including the Salt
taxes, th:e Income 'l'a.x , Likin, and
the Stamp Duty. The expenses oi
the Central Government, apart
fmm Domestic and foreign Loan
obligations, and "Ubsidies to tha
military a.nd civil officials of the
Provinces, a.re estimated at a.p p•r oximately nin(el million dollars per
month. 'I'he late Mliniste!I' of Finance suggested th"lt it might be
po ible to reduce them to fo111r
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million dollars.
The actual remittances from the Provinces from
J a,nuary to Septemb~r 1922 amounted, apart from Salt and Customs
revenuE>, to $231,000 per month.
The C\ustoms, SaH, and fW[ne and
Tobacco revenues a.r e all pledged
foiJ' the service of forerign or domestic debts. It cannot be hoped
to enforce uniform Inc001e Tax and
Stamp Duty unles the collection
of these imposts is under the oontrol of the Central Government.
And unless it can control the Likin
collec.t ion, the Treaty Powers will
n01t give their assent t,o1 the proposed inorease of the Oustoms Tariff.
Pl!:lradoxical as it may seem, certain o£ the Northern militarists
who have themselves. been the worst
offenders in their persistent defiance, and interference with, the
Central Government, are the strongest opponents of a,ny measure of
Provincial autonomy. Their idea
of
centralized Government for
Oh•ina is a Government cornsisting
entirely o£ their puppeis, which
ta.kes orders from them' and from
:them aJone. If the,r e' were any

a
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really big man among th&Se militarists, capable, uirder exis.t ing conditions, ot assuming and exercising
a dictatorship over the whole
nation, there might be something
to be said fo1r their view. But n.ot
one of them is of the political
stature nece ary for the role of
dictator over a. nation of fou11.· ·h undred millions o£ 1 eople. None oi
them has the financial or the military resources necessary to subdue
the eightee•n Provinces of China
Proper, the t}_lree Manch1'u'ian Provinces, and the Outer Territories.
'rheir appo ition, therefore, to decon1ralixa.tion in any iio11'1n, merely
ha the effect of delaying the
promulgation of the Permanent
Oonstitution, now virtually com.
plete except for the Cha.p ter de:fiming the re~ pective pmvers and
Iespon'S ibilities of the Central and
Provincial Govemmen ts .
At the moment the functions of
the C'entra[ GovernmeiJlt aTe, in
theory, >ested in the PTesident, the
Cabinet!:·, and the• two Houses of
Padiament.
Tlhe Constitution
under which the country is suppo ed to be administered is the
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provisional (Nanking) Constitu_
tion of 1918, the only portion of
the Permanent Con titution which
is actually law being the Chapter
defining the qualifi.catiorns, method
o:f election, and t!l'Ilure of office o£
the Preside'llt and Vice-President.
There has been no Vice~President
since August 1917. The President
a.t the moment is General Li Yuan.
hung, one o:f the o~I-iginal leader
od' the Republican movemoot r,t
\¥uchang, who was elected VicePresident in October 1913, succeeded Yuan Shih-kai :for the une'Xpired portion o,£ his teTm in June 1916,
resigned after the Chang Hsun
cotttp in August 1917, and reassumed the Presidency at the urgent
request of Generals Tsao Kun and
Wu Pei-fu, and of various public
organizations throughout the country, in June, 19'2'2. A condition
of his !~assumption o£ office was a
pledge from the Northern milit.arsists that they would support him
in his efforts to eliminate militarism, and abo[ish the Tuchuu
system. Needles to say they had
no sooner induced him to rerl:.u rn
to Pekin<>' than they £orgort all
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about the·i r pledge. They publicly
defied and humiliated him. T\sao
Kun ai\d his supporters· c.ornspired
to supplant him, with the aid of
their pall:lia.mentaJ.'Y p·u ppets. And
though £rom time to time the President has announced. his determina.tion not to submit £U1·ther to
military dictation or inter:fleTence
he has, in successive in ta.nces,
been compelled to yield to their
pressure.
The present C.a.binet.,
the ninth within fifteen months,
is a Paoting cll"ea.t ion, the las.t
Ministry having been overt.hro•w n
as the result of a conspirac.y hatched in Pa.oting, a.n d earned out! by
its parliamentary puppets, with
the President as an unwilling a.ccessorv. Even it has found the
inter£~rence of the Northern milita.r ists intolerablle, and only a short
time ago tendered its. resignation,
en bloc., as a protes•t -meekly to
return to duty when it found that
Pa.ot.ing amd Loya.ng were obdUl"ate
in their demands.
On Parliament only a few words
need be wasted. It is the Parliament elected at the beginning of
1913, dissolved by President Yuan
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Shih-kai in January 1914, reconvened by President Li Yuan-hung
in June, 1917, again dissolved in
June 1917, and reconvened on
August 1, 1922. Only the most
primitive a.rrarngements' could he
made :for ca1·rying through the
original elections, with the !'esult
that the members of both houses
consist, for the mo&t part, of professional po·l iticians of the most
unscrupulous type. Most of the
members, in addition to Parlia·
mentary salari.es o·u t o:f a.lll proportion to the normal standa~rd of living in this' coruntry, draw sub idies,
or acce·p t bribes, from the militar·
ists,
and
interested
politiool
cliques. Chinese papers on several
occasions have stated the price per
vote paid by interested paxtioes i..o
secure parliament.a.try support, ntnd
these statement have never been
contradicted. The Senate, a.fter
more than nine month in session
has :failed; to agree on the choice
of the a. new Speaker. The Speaker
of the IPwer House was, only a few
weeks ago, stated to ha.ve been tht!
instigator of a disgraceful brawl iu
a Peking restaurant. From August
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1 up to the prese~t date Parliament

has no·t produced a single construe.
tive piece of legislation. When it
does meet-which is infrequently,
owing to the difficul t.y O•f o>btaining
a quorum in either Hous·e -it O<ften
breaks up in diso·r der, as the resu~t
of scuffles armO<ng the Iival factions,
and the hurling o{ ink-bottles
across tire flom. Yet this monstrosity arrogates to itself 1the right
ro a.b rogate Treaties formally CO<ncluded by the Central Government. Its constant naggings, inter.
pellations,
and
impeachments,
render th,e, adjustment of any
question adle<>.t ing China's foreign
relatioos quite impo sible. And jt
ha, recently sought to desecrate the
old and stately palace buildings O<i
the Manchu Emperonl• by transfer.
ring itself and its quarreils to the
Halls and co1U'tvards where the
"Son o£ Heaven'; formerly received the homage of his subjects,
silent and impassive in the presence
o·f kneeling multitu.rles•. Theplight
to which China's militarist~ and
colfrupt. politicians. have reduced
their country will form the theme
of future article .
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III.
INSUBORDINATION IN THE
PROVINCIES.
THE CentJ'al Governm~nt beci.ng
impotent, the ProVInces anll
left very much to their own de·
vires, with the resu~t that they are
administered in the most ha.pha.z ard
manner. Th'e. principal authority
in the Pl'Ovinoo ought, of course, to
be the Civil Governor, to whom, in
theory, are entru,rt:ed all governmental activities except those 01f a
military chaJ'acter.
He is supposed to control and to supEl'tvise
all the tell'ritorial officials of lower
rank, from the Taayin to the village tipao, and is (in theory) responsible for foreign, fina.n cial, educational, and to a limited extent
judicial, a:ffa.ira throughout the
Provin e. The Tuchun, or Military Govet'll.orr outranks the Civil
GovernQor, but, except in times of
disturbance, is supposed to confine
hi~ activities entirely to military
affair . In mo t of the Provinces,
1.Qo-day, the C~vil Governor is a
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mere cipher.. . Where such an
official ac.tually functions---and in
many Provinces the 'l'u~hun and
the U.i vil Governor me 011 e and the
same perso·n -he is the subordinate
o£ the :Military Governor, who is
the reaJ ruler of the Prorvince. A
prete,nce of fl.emoci'atic governme'llt
18 maintained hy the continued
existence of Provincial Assemblies,
hut iu most province5 these local
legisla.t.Uies are composed oo the
Tuchun's nominees, or at any rate
of servile politicians who dare no-t
questio•n his authority.
The aveTage Tuchun c.ares
nothing fo•r i.he w~Ha.re of his Pro.
vince or its population. .All of his
energies are concentra.t ed upon the
strengthening- of his own position
by means of the expansion 01£ the
military forces under his command. 'I'he Provincial revenues,
supplemented by such sums as can
he stolen froon, or blackmailed out
of, the CPntral Government, are
mainly u:tilized for military expenfl.iture. The Province o£ Clhihli, alone, maintains an army twothirds the size o·f that o£ Great
Britain (exclusive ot£ India), from
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which the population derives no
be.nefit whatsoever, and which. · is
iur.apable even o·f protecting life
a.nd property within the provincial
l:;oundaries. The maintenance of
this useless horde of armed coolies
absorbs not only a very large perrenta~e orf all the revenues collec.t ed within the Province, but also
nece!'sita.tes the extortion of millions of dollars per annum from the
Peking Government. Not a loan
c·an be raiseld, not a release of salt
revenue can be effected, without
Paoting claiming its shaJ:e. As
mentioned in a previaus article, the
late Minister or£ Finance recently
disdosed the fact tbla.L from J anuary to Reptember 1922, the total
remittances to Peking frqm the
Provinces amounted to only $231,000 pru· month, or $2,087,000 in
all. And ag·ainst this pittance remitted to Peking must be put the
seizure o£ $31,000,000, or more
than one third of the tc:rlal Salt
Hevenue, "hy Provincial Authorities or M.i litary Commanders."
'l'he Salt ReiVenues, it may be
men•tiomed in pa.c;sing, are supposed to be paid, int.act, into a special
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account in the Banks which pa.rticipated in the flotation of the
Reorganization Loan.
This, however, is not by any
mea,n s the only instancl.'l o£ deliberate violation of China's inte•rna tional engngetments by the Provincial authorities.
There is
hardly'a Province today, in whi:-:h
foreign T'reaty rights in rega.r d to
transit pass exemption are not
d elibemtely and persistently violated. Tlhe Tuchuns and the·ir
parasites are ever on, the look-out
for additional sources of income,
the latest example of their effrontery and disregard for the Treaties
being the imposition in Chekiang,
of a twenty per cent. tax on cigaret.tes,-which has been levied by the
Tuchun with the a.ppmval a.£ the
Provincial As emlJly. Railways,
whose propeu-ty and l'olling-st<>ck
have been pledged as securi1;y to
foreign bondholders, or which owe.
large sums to foreign and Chinese
ereditors for equipment, ha.v e been
s.eized by the milita.r ist.s in North
and mid-China, and operated solely for their owu benefit, l'egardless of the rapid deterioration of
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the lines and their rolling-stock,
and of China's international obligations. And as if the misa.p propriatioo o·£ ordina.r y Provincial
Tevenue the loo•t ing o·f the Salt
re-venues, and the seizure o-f railway earnings were not enough,
many of the Tuc.huns are reviving
the cnHivation of and traffic in
opium to augment their incomes.
In one Province alone-Shansiis any !lerious attempt being made
to conduct the administration in
i.h e interests, :~nd for the welfare,
of the population.
Provincial jealousi€s operate to
pt·event any serious a.ttempt at cooperation between neighbouring
Provinces. The provincial boundaries are usually the safest areas
jn which bandits can congregate,
for if the authorities of one province are stined to action, the outlaws can generally be sure of immunity just across the oound.a.ry.
Seldom will the local milita.r y au
thorities in one province loyal'ly
co-operate with their neighbours.
The Provincial Militarists defy
Peking without the least compunction. The refn,.al ()l the Hupeh
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and Kiangsi T'uchuns· to recognize,
or to allow to assume ofrice·, Civil
Governors appointed by the l::>r-eside<nt, has already been mentioned.
An equally flagrant exam-ple--though in this imta.nee public
opinion was behind the offenderwas the Shanghai Defence Commissioner's veto upon the reviseil
postal tariff. The Foreign Diplomats at Peking must he weary of
recording their protests against
Provincial insubordination, and
deliberate violations of
treat.y
rights-protests which elicit no reply at all, or else an evasive answer
which reveals the impotence o£ the
\Vaichiaopu. In one instance only
dnring the pas.t few monthrJ has
diplomatic action producecl any
satisfactory result, and that was
when the Diplomatic Bo1ly · a.u nounced its intention of despatching an InternatioiLal Commission
to investigate the bandit outrages
in Honan. In general the Tuchm:~,s simply ignore any protests. or
representatio·n s
transmitted
to
them through the Waichiaopu.
The insubordination of t.h e Provincial Authorities canno.t be over-
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come until the power orf the militarists is broken, and, as long as
it continues, must render futile
any schemes for financial or administrative refol'm which are bas.
ed upon the supposition tha,t engagements entered ·into by the Oentral Government wiill be loyally
fulfilled.

IV.
THE ARMY.

t\_N Army is generally understood
-'to be an armed and disciplined force cA men, subject to the
orders of the Government, and
available for the defence of the
nation against ext,ei'nal aggression,
and the mainten•a'tlce of ill tern a .
order. In this sense China posses es no army.
There are, exclusive of some tens of thousands
of bandits i:Q various parts of the
country, upwards of 1,332,000 men
under anns in various national and
provincial units--a larger number
of armed men than is maintained
by any other· country in the worltl.
But these armed hor•des are not

24availaMe for, and would be utterly
useless in, repelling foreign aggression. Of the million and a, third
men who carry rifles and wear
uniforms o£ some descrription or
another, there are not thirty-thousand whO' would be capable o±
offering effective resistal!lce to hal£
their number of properly equippeu
and
well-disciplined
J a.p ane"e,
Ameiican, or European troops. The
Ghinese armies are not. und1!r the
orders or control of the Central
Government or o£ Parliament, Lut
are employed by, and recognize no
authority other than that of, the
Tuehu.ns. During the last iew
years o£ the Manchu regime a
serious a.t.tempt was made to o·rganize a modern, national army, o·f
360,000 trained troops. This Lu
Chun or national army has becomP
r..oo:npll etely disintegrated since the
Revolution. The President of the
Republic and the Cabinet cannot
rely upon the SiUpport of a single
Division in the event of any sudden emergency. No serious ~·.t
t~mpt is made, to-day, to stan·
dardize arms, uniforins, equipment
or ammunition. At least seven
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types of rifles ~·e known to be i J'
u'ie and there IS an even greatrr
variety of artillery and machineO'UllS.
There is no central com~and the War Ministry and GPneral 'gt,a.ff exercising no eontrol
whatsoever over the Tuchuns'
forces. T~ere is no practical pln.n
of mobilizatio'll o;r concentration.
Unless two Provinces ha.p pen to· be
under the control o£ the <arne
Super-Tucbun or Tuchun, no• forr.e
located in one Province would b.e
available for operations in another.
As a ddence against foreign
invasion, therefore, China's nrrmed
forre.'io are utterlly uReless. But -for
the difficulties of communicatim1.
due to the ab. ence o£ roads E'U i~
ahle for wheeled transpoi"t, onP.
well-equipped foreig-n Divisio·u
could march from end to end of thf\
c'otmtry. As it is, a Foreign Divi~ion, ·upported by :1 small navn I
force, and equipped with aeJ·oplnnes and modern artillery, could
effect a landing in any part O'f
China accessible to vessels of
mcditun d1•a ught and its l'adius c.f
adion would b~ limited only · b..\'
thf" p.mMem o·f transport. 'Dhere
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is ha.rdly a G enera.l in the Chinese forces who has even an elementary conception o£ modern
strategy or tactics ; there is pmhably not a single unit tha.t woulu
offer effective resistanc'e to an oifen ·ive supported by modern
heavy and :field a.r tillery, a.eroplanes, tanks, etc . caJ:ried out· b:v
a force one-tenth to one-fifth o£ its
When,
own numerical strength .
therefore, China's milit:u"y b~·ag
garts, o·r half-baked students, talk
o£ :fighting the Japanese, or the
Reds, or any other well-equipperl
foreign £oa·~.:e, anyone acquainted
with the adua.l condition of
Chiim's armies must find it difficult to repJ"ess a smil e. An engag-ement bch\·eon any of Ghina.'s
pre,;enl-clay armies, and a really
efficient militn;ry fo1··ce would result in the massacl'e o£ eveu"y unit
that Jill not holt from t.he field as
!loon as i.lte fighting began.
As a factor in the maintenance
of i1dernnl o1der the Chine~tJI
armies are equally useles '·
:F'or
t.h e most part th 'Y are the fomenters ·of disorcler rather than the
guardialns o£ the puhlic.
The

Chine!'ie at·e naturally a peac aule
race. If they were not. unusually
lono·-su[eiing they woull d long ago
hav~ risen against the militcny
tymnny to which they have bePJt
s~tl1jeded . As it is, tlie.y meekly
Huhmit. tv, though they bit,terly resent, the presence o£ i.J.'OO'}J in their
midst1. Mutinie. and civil war
haYe c•.aluj eel untold su.ffelring under
tho llepublio, and have 1esult.ed
in the de tructionJ of many millions
0 £ dollars' wo!l:th of private pr()lperty. An unpaid and "tmcliscipliued soldiery is a constaJlt menace
to public pe~ce, and affords a prolific recruiting ground £o•r the
bandit ho!I'des which :flourish
throughout the 00111ntry,
and
against whom the troops--who in
many ca es are actually in league
with the bandits-give no protection.
What China's armies co t the
nation directly and indirectly, it
is impossible :to est.imate. It must
run into several hundred million8
o£ dollars a year. For the armieo.
absorb not only the bulk o£ the
Pwvincial and National l'evem.ues,
but the g1·eater part o£ every loan
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which the Central Government
co·n tri ve to raise fr m foreign or
Chinese sources, and, with a few
noteworthy exceptions, the troops
li>e to a very lai·ge extent upon
the communities among which they
are quartered, either by open robbery, cr iby compelling the inhabitanis to ac·cept de'J)'rec:La,ted pape•r
eurrcncy at a fictitious value.
1'he1·e is hardly a department of
the administration into which the
blight of milii arism has not penetrated. It is the direct cause of
C'hina't; insolvell'cy, of the ruin oi
her f::\tate railways and of the J.'ec:rudeseenee uf t.h e opium h 1affio.
It render~:~ the impartial aurl
elfi.c.i eut auministration of the law
impoosible. It is the c.:'tuse of the
starvation of China'. ed~wationaJ
imtitutions. It is re ponsible for
constant friction between: the Central Government a.n d the Treaty
Powers. It interposes an insuperruble obstacle to the realizaticlll of
China's legitimate national aspiiations.
'l'l1e Delega.tes of the Gorvernments n:p1·e~:~ented aL l'\\7~'1shington
took so grave a Yiew of "the main-
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tenance in various parts of the
c·ountry, of military force , exces.
~iYe in number and controlled by
the miliim:y chiefs ·01£ the Prowithorut co-ordinati<•>n,"
vinces
thai they adopted a resoluhoo em
bodying a serious wnming i.o the
('hinese Government; and Sir
Ho·ha.rt Borden, who explnined the
aUilude of the sub-Committe.e
which ch·afted this resolutioJl, stated i.1at. ''sJ lang a ihe military
g-oYernors retained ihei1· present
dominating autho·r ity and influence, the provision of great re''eHues or the placing of largl) funds
at tl1e dislJosal of a. weal: Administral ion,
would
p10brubly
he
absorbed io a very great extent by
these military chiefs instead of being employed to cut do~ their
power." Jt. was :Lhe Might od' militarism, therefore, which influenced
the Delegates in rejecting China's
reque,c;t for •rariff Alllrtonomy, und
in imposiDig I'estrictions on any
mmease in i..he existing Import
'ral'it!. Various proposals for disLandmP,nt have been put forward,
mo. t otf which are impracticable
be(!uu~e they depend fo•r fulfilment
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upon a huge financial outlay, and
upon the loyn 1 co-operation of
Militarists who have hown very
clearly by their rl'!cent actions that
they harve not the slightest intention of reducing .thei1' foi'Ces. No
scheme for the disbandment or£
two... thil·ds of the present armed
fome · whi h would leiave China
with ample troops for all her reasonable requiremenf.s.--has yet
· been devised which has the ren1Jotest prospec.t of succeeding.
Tuchunism remains the crux of
the Ohinese pi'ohlem, and at tha
moment it seems to be a problem
for which no real olutioDJ c.a.n be
found.

v.
PUBLIO JUSTICIE.

NOtime

need be wasted in dit;cus.sing the Chine e Navy, for
it cannot. be considered a serious•
factor in the Far E,as.t ern situation.. Tlh.e Chinese sailor, welltrained, ma;y b:e an exceUent seaman, but in these da.y s of SuperDieadnoughts, suhmarine+s, and
long~ range guns and' torpedoes,
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the Qhinese Navy would be useless
for offence or deience . It contains
no vessel largeT than a [ight crui ser and even i:f it could be concen'tr.arted, a:n,d do·uld secure sufficient coal--on credit-to put to
sea the whole fleet coulrl be taken
on 'by one modern battleship or
battle-cruiser. We turn, therefore,
to our next subject, the administration of public: justice! in· this
country. At li.:n, early stage in
China's :foreign r•elations the Western Powei'S realized tha.t li:fe would
be intolei"able for their &UJhject~
who resided in, or tradelcl with,
China, if they wen~ subject to
Chinese jUl'isdictio•n . They therefore adopted in Ohina the system
which had previously been a.dopted iQ other non-Christian na.tions
-the system of ~xtra.territol'i a l
jurisdiction. This system admif·tedly has numerous· drawback . a1Hl
constitutes an infrinO'ement of the
sovereignty of the country in
which it is enforced. It has tr(}m
!ime ~o time boon grossily abused
m Q:hma, chiefly by some of the
Latm States with oompaJ'atively
small interests in this country.
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But· it w s. the only pr:alctical al,
tern:.ttive to the , ubjection of foreigner'. to the binese tribunals,
with theili barbarous punislnnents,
whol esale con"Uption, a.n,d alien
theories of jurisprudence.
'Dhe impact of Western influence on the East, n,ncl i.he growing
national consciousness of the Chinese, n,aturally led to a desire to
exercise• the full r~ghts of so.v ereignty, and in the British, Amt>Tican and . J apa:nese Commercial
Treaties of 1902-3 the Porwers concernecl agreed i.o assist China in
the reform of her judicial sysi.em,
and to r linquish their extraterrito·r ial rig·his when satisfied "tbnt
the state of the CJJ.inese b-ws, the
a.I"''a ngements for their administration, and other conside1%tions' ·
wananted them in so doing. At
Ver ailles, and again at \iVa hington, the .hinese Dele""at.es attempted to penma.de the GOIVernlnents of the Treaty Po\YCTS to relinquish
their
extra-teiTitorial
rights within a. fixed period-by
the end of 1924 at Versailles; at
a da.t e to be agreed up0n at Washington.

33
No'v in discussing this q1mst.io·n
it io> neces ary briefly, and in
simple. lang·uage, to consider exactly wbal pTivileges are confeneLl
upon foreigners who are protected
bv Consular Jurisdiction.
'HH.! Y
ai'·e, in ihe fil',·:t plaee, amena.b lc
only lo their own judicial or consulai' authol'itieo:: w·heu accused ot
any criminal otl:encc, or a~Jpew·ing
as de£endan s in any civil suib.
They w·e subject to the laws nt
their own nation, except in w far
aH they may be modified by sper:ial le~·islatiun, it~ surh mai,te.rs as
marriage, divo1·ce, p1obate, and
('Ompany inc011}0ration. They ranuot be compelled to pay any kind
o£ taxation impose,d by the Chinese Central or Provincial Govenlments, without the apprQIVal o:f
their home govemmcnts. Obviously thPse priYileges operate in derogation o:£ China's sovereci.gnty.
and can be justified on1y i£ very
strong reas(}ns r:an be adduced
therefor. China's official spokesmen arg·ue iha.t these reasons no
longer exist; that codes ba.scd upon
lllodern \Veslern prndice have now
beeu compiled :mel promulgated;
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and that pl"operly tl"ained judges
are a.va.ilable fo·r the trial of civil
and criminal cases in which forelgnei are de£endaiDt \
It is tnw tha.t a whole ser:ie,g of
codes haYe been compiled and promu!Lga.ted, ·w ith the aid <>f ContinE-ntal and Japanese experts, and
b.a ed la:rgely up<>n the Na.pole<>nic
Oode--which in many rr,spects is
entirely irreconcilable with AngloSaxon jmisporudence. It is true,
too, th~.t a ~erta.in number of modern-ti·ained Chinese a1'e se·rvi11g
a~ Judges and Promu·a.t ors in the
Supreme C'ourt, and BO'lil.e o£ the
higher J?ro·v incial T1'ibunals. But
it i~ not irue that China is yet
withill measurable distance o£ the
clay when "the state of the. Chinese laws" and the "arrangements
£or the•i r administration" would
warrant . the relinquishment' of
Consula.r jurisdiction. The withdrawal of Goll~ular pro·t ection
would, in our opinion, be waJ.·T antecl <>nly when C.hina could produce indisputal>le proofs o£ the
supremacy <>£ the la.w, and the impartial administrati<>n oJ justice,
throughout the country.
A few
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specially orgal\ized Courts for
h'a111dling :foreign ca es, even if
they were efficient to begin with,
would soon deteriorate toward the
general level o{ the adminisb:ation
of public ju.s•tice throughout the
country. And that level is almost
incredibly low. The Ruspension o£
Ru.ssian Consular jurisdiction in
Ma.nelnnia. ha& revealed what foreigners might expect to suffer if
ihey were once placed unre ervedl y
at the mercy o£ the Chinese
authoriiies. "'1/{e need no·t here re1er in deta.il to the exiJ.•aordinary
incompetence disp~ ayed by the
GhineHe judiciary in M :mch1U"ia,
numbers exam11 les o£ which were
given in the China Year Book,
19~1-2.
Nor need we elwell upon
the
erratic
and
exorbitant
taxation
imposed
upon
the
RuSfliam~ by the local Chinese
authorities
in
the
Chinese
Basiern Railway Zone, which is
mentioned in the cmTent issue of
the' same publieation. Tlht; t.ltJntmen,t n£ the Russians in ManclnlTia is a conclu::~ive exposm'e of
the unfitness of the C:hinese
judiciall-y to a.;;sume power over the
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lives, liberties, anu prol erty' o.f
foreigners ..
Vile approach the subject, tht refore, :from another n ngle. No really enlightened Ohinesfll can seriously
expec,t the Foi'eign GovernmE·nts
concerned to surrenuer this ]e:llously guarded p1ivilege of I'Xtratenitoriality on i·he me1e f;llppo·ition that ali will be well. 'l'he
:B'oreign Governments ~M·e entitlt->ol,
before• giving serious consideratiou
to China's request, io• sati~fy illemselves that Uhinese law is ~:-,tis
factorily administered over 111e
citizen of tiLe C:hinefle n .e puhlil'.
'rhey cannot be e.·pected 1o j ~ga.1·d
their nationals as fitting· mbj••ets
for experiment where the Chinese
judiciary is concer-ned. And when
this te t is applied, China's w!·.ole
ca.se .for abolition collap~es. 'I.'1he
law, hke other branche:-; of the adminislmtion• of the Tiep11iblie, is
governed hy force :mJ by expediency. The most prominc11t
Chine ·e citizens-aH has been
shown m the caRe oi Mr. Lo \Veukan, who until De(;ember, 192~
wa.· MiHister o£ l:finance-can be
illegally arr·ested, and ubseqll-ent-
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Qy imprisoned for month.s on end,
without any charges bemg fGrmula.ted or any pretence of trial,
merel; iG gratify the spite o·t
their political enemies . A Turhun
-a'S the execution of Mr. Rhih
Yang, a lawyer wlw hn<l identifteil.
bimsel f with the rrrent agitation.
among t hP railwaymmt, showul-('an h'a vtl a ('him•se cilizen Hhoi out,
of hand, and then have the additional eft' ron tery to pretend that
it wa;; do11e uuder an article in the
Criminal Code 'Vhich prescribes a.
maximum JJ Cnaliy o{ fwr y'l:'ars' impri . onment or a. fine1 of $300 for
the offence .allegetl. 'frnffic i11 or
the con sumption of opium, an<l
gambling are otfenees •tmlel' th~:
Crim_inal Onde . There is hardly a
Tuchun who is not openly engaged
in tha opium trnfflc, and who does
11ot encourage and protect his subordinates in t.b e viola.tion of the
011ium lawf!. A R;u.c;siml Captain in
whose cahin a qua.nlit.y of opium
was discovered, at Ohefoo, was removed hom his ship, ancl sentenced to two years imprisonment,
n~cenily . Yet if the law were impart.ially
ndrniui:ie•r ed
nearly
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every Tuchun, and a very large
percentage oi hi· subordinate.
\'ioulrl be "doi11g' time." Simill arly, with gambling. Nearly every
('.h inese' po,l itic,i an is kno,w n to
gamble for large ~ta k es, in public
J est::nuants.
'l'hc Speaker of the
Honse of Representatives was recently re>~pon~ible for an unseemly
hra ,Yl , while plnying ?nah-jong in
n PPking JI tel. 'J'he propri tor
was compell ed by the police to
apO>logize to him for being assaulted, and fo lutving his furniture
smashed up.
'o action wliat;;oeve'l' wa.c:;. take11 again . t ihe S-peaker
eith e:~• for violl enre or' fot' ga.mhling.
Yet the Peking Ortroi
will seize and confiseate mah-.ionrJ
sets destined for a forrign Club,
on the ground ihnt?nah-jong is .nn
illrrg al ga.m1Jlling game.
The C01ine. e judiciary would
dearly love to ex rei e ihei1 authority over foreign erf: generally,
and it would fa,l ill with thoRe
whose interests were not caretfullv
watched by their Consuls, O<r whos~
Comu1.· ha.d no·t. the means to· bark
up their dema1Hl1> fm· ju. tire. The
~urrender of Oonsular Jurisdiction
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under existing eouditions would
parnly~e trade_, drive _:ma.IJ~ o£ tl1o
mo~:t. ~mb~l.aniwl foreign, wiere t8
out o:f the country, and opemte
f.olely in favo•u r o£ any unscrupulous· fo•r eigners familiar ·w ith, and
willing to pander to , C[Jinese col·nqdiou. Justice, in th e~ ordinarily aeeepted ense o£ t.h e word , i ·
unobtainable in himt while the
present admini ·tr.a tive h.aos pr vails . In the opinion o£ Mr. 13.
Leno·x Simpson, Adviser to the
President.' , OffiP.e, the ra.i singof the
question of aboliRhing· exh'a terrilol'ialily, at \Va.-:hing-t.on, "wiih
th result o·£ the appointment of
an lnlernationnl Commission to
investigate that m att er" was "a
serious blunder.
The Commission," he added, "will certainly
investigate the administration o£
justice and the treatment o:£
Rus ·ian , in Manchuria., whieh
may do China serious harm j£ the
Commission' report is publishecl,
as the present position l eaves much
to be desi.rrd and a lar•g e number
of per. ons are waiting to give damaging evidence." The only thing
to be said IO!I.' raisin"'
i.he que tion '
0
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in our opm10n, is this: tLat. if the·
Gomruission does meet and publish
its report, the douche of eold truth
ma.y repress some of the conceit
and self-satisfadion i~ evidenctll m
i.hose circles which take the v1ew
that. China has only i.o make enough noise about a.uyUung to bmnboo~le the 'l'l'eaiy 1>owe1-::~, and to
get her own way.

VI.
EDUCATION.

THE Uan~hu!!!, in 1908, adopted
a ddini le programme of Gonstitulioual dovelopment which pr()..
vided, a.mo11g nther things, for the
systematic expansion of edJUicational facilities of all gra.des throughout the Chine e Empire.
The
nine year's programme, which was
to ble put in Lo force between J909
and 1917 waR arranged in the expectation that at the end of thE~
period five per cen.L .of the population would l:e ahle to read and
write. Statistics published for the
yea•r 1910 (Lhe first year o£ H. M.
Rsuan 'l'ung) ho·wed tba.t there
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wc1e altogether 57 ,2G7 Govern·
ment Universities, college$ anll
schools of different gra.lles, with a
total number of students o£ 1,626,·
f>29, and 89,362 teacher,s. Owing
to the prevailing chaos througlwut
China tJlre ~Iinistry of Educatio~,
has l·een Ul£13 ble to publish a.n y
stati.stirs since 1917, and those for
that yea.r were incomplete, no returns having been received from
HzC'{~huan, Kweicht,w, or Kwangsi.
In that ye:u the number of schools
was :.:·iven aa 121,119, the numbel'
of Rtu,dents as 3,914,454, and th£~
numLer of teachers as 129,221.
This inerease, iu view o£ the mis·
appropriation of J?r·o·v incial and
Na.tiona,l revenues by the militarisLs, and the <hie lplessneiSS of the
Central Government, must 1be con~idered rather remarkable. It is. to
he feared that in the intervening
five yea1·s it has not been ruaillitnined.
'rhere is, unque. tionably, a
thirst :£01r knowledge, however
superficial, amo<ng- upiper• and
middle-class
(;hinese-a
thirst
which it is becoming more and
rnore difficult to grat·i fy owing

the financial difficult.ies o£ the Go·vernmeut.. l)rofessors and teachers
of Govel11lillle•n t institutions have
had to do without their pay for
months ou end, and a.t time. , exasperated by the seeming indifference o£ the Authorities, have coone
out on strike to compel attention
to their grievances.
]~ven, however, when the Government has
clefinitely ea~mark.ed certain revenues for educa.tional expenses, it
has seldom been :tble to keep its
pledges. And numerous Government cducntioiJlnl institutioos still
mainia~n a preca.rious existence on
this aCCO!UIDt.
'l'he um·e st among the unpaid
teachers is natural. But o£ recem,iJ
years we ha,ve< witnessed a.n other
phenooncnon, in the form o£ increasing insurl:ordina.t ion among
the student . Every national sy':!.tem of educa.tion must depellld for
its efficicucy mainly upton the
&trict enforceme.n t o£ discipline,
especia.Uy in the lower grades of
schoo1 . :More latitude i usually
nllrm·ecl in Universities, but h e1e
also the authority o£ the Governing l:ody or the staff is pammount
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in snch matters as the nature o£
the currie-dunn, the standard required for succ.ess at eiXa.minatiJoiils,
and the gffileral conduct of the
siudeuts during te·r m-time.
In
Ghina we have seen students object
to the curriculum, refuse i.o take
il1e examinations required f.o.r
Rpr<'ific: degree!' or certific.a.t e ,
defy aml maltrea.t their professors
and teachers, and absent themselves at their own sweet will,
whonevcr they desire to participatfl
in political and other demonstraiionR. We do•nht whether then~
are more than two Government instit.ui.ions o£ any standing, in
('hina., where any serious a.t tempt
is marle to enforce discipline, and
where it is made1 a C()ndition o£
admission t.ha.t &tudents shall refrain, during enrolment, from pariir.ipation in any political demcxnstrations.
The siudents o£ China have got
completely out. of hand during the
past four or fiv\~ year'S, and it is to
he regretted that insubordination
is almost as rife in foreignconi rollPfl (chiefly Missionary)
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institutions, M
m Government
schools and GoUeges.
Before
they have reaehed the age o·f discrliltion, before they can possibly
have acquired the experienc~
necessary to qualify them as competent jurlges on matters of
11alional and even iuteTnational
im1,·ortance, simle11tR o£ all ages
and holh sexes will foiJ.·sake their
studies, sometimes for days on
end, to take p:ut in anti-foreig11
or anti-Governm€nt street processions and other demonstrations,
which have not iufr'e quently endeel in i he desi.J·uction of privattl
and public property, the kidnapping o£, m' a.'lsau.lts u.po·11 r putahle
citizens, and the wholesale intimidation o£ the merchant olasses.
It is a pitiful spectacle-the more
pitiful because China is traditionally a country when~ old age
is treated with respect, aud
paterna[ authority is supreme.
'JThe younger generation o•f China,
headstrong, ill-informed, and impatient o£ any form of discipline
is an important £ador in the prevailing chaos, And although the •
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militarists a1·e int<>lerant of any
r.haUenge to their own authority
· hy the student class, they not ooly
c·;mnive at, hut a.ctu.ally instigate,
anti-foreign and other demonstraiions which do not tend to WJdermine their own pretPnRions.
It is raiher late in ihe day now
ecover cmdrol o£
hina's student&. The Go·v crument Juts not the prestige or the
authority necessary to restore di:;eipline. The Missionary institulion:'l awoke too late to the COJJHequenres of the firf-11 act.~ of insnl,nrilinaiion, and Reem fearfu l ,
today, o£ clraHtic ac lion for the
restoration of orclcr, lest they
should [ose a large percentage o-f
their pupils. But. it. seems to m
that. this is a problem in the solu ·
Iion of which they oug·ht at least
to. aitempt to lead the way. TlJcy
m1ght fiU[er, by the loss o£ many
of their students in the first instance.
But they raier to• a. 0O'row•
mg need, which the Government
institutions are incapable, for
financial and poliiical reasons of
.
.
'
:p1eetmg, and 1£ they were to act
to aHempL to
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with unanimity and firmness it
would not, we think, be long he- .
fore they could obtain all the
pupils they CQUld poo i.My teach,
under guarantees which wouVl
preclude auy wholesale insubordination, or political activity.
Before iih.lere can be any hope of
real improvement in the discipline
of Government educational institutions, drastic changes will be
necessary in connection with the
teaching stafl, especially in the
Universities. One can hardly expect students who witness the
nauseat~n1 g spectacle o£ their pro,
fessors' ti01a.dyi11g :to1, and fnatern:izing with a notorious Bolshevik
agent, to lE-arn respect for
authority, or obedience to orders.
&-.holars like the Hon. Bertrand
Rus. el, with their ultra-radical
and unorthodox views ma.y do n£1
!hi:nm among intelligent British
audiences. They are not of the
type likely to benefit the rising
generation ·in China, already fa.r
too readily inclined to adopt any
bi7.arre theories or philosophies,
however impractica-ble and id~
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listie. 'l'he root ca.u se of China's
presont difticulties is the attempt
t.o graft on to an ancient but
politically ha.ckwa.r d State a system
of governmetnrt fitted only £or an
advanced democracy. Ghina was
not ready for republican Governm.ent in 1912. She is not ready
for it. to-day. And the taaching of
extreme radic.:'tlism to the rising
generaii01l1 is calculated to widen
the bwach between tillling-s as they
are, rund things as certain idealists
''"ould like them to b~. 'l'he pm<'ess o£ political evolution cannot
})'(' aeceletated be:yond certain
limits in a va,st. oountcy where the
masses are so bac.kward politically,
a,; the G'hina of ta-day. And the
last thing to be desired is that the
higher institutions o£ learning
should turn ourt students who can
talk •n10 end o£ claptrap a,l:;out
sociaJlism, and capitalism com.
'
mumsm
and free-loNe, witho.ut
even an elementary understanding
of the fundamental problems
which must be soJvad before
China can takt1 her plac.e on an
equal footing, among the great
'!lations o£ the earth.
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VII.
C011l·)I lJNIOA'l'ION,

']_"lHE development of communications in China has bet'ln
sel'iou ly hn.m pe1 d by administra-tive i11efil\'il'·JH;y, and military interference, under the Republic,
especially during i.he pa t few
years. Hailwn.y construction has
virtlu:ally come io a standstill.
ExistL.n,g railways :ue rapidly detm·iora.ting, owing to the misapp l'G~Jriai.ion of revenues 1Yy the
militari,·t .. " 7i rele s communica1ions, in regard to which Oh~un.
might well have benefited frOiiil :the
experienre of :foreign Power , hav1~
beicome a subject of internat ional
discord, owing to the confl.ictill1g
conces ions which have been gta.nted to floreign c mpauies by different depa.r tment of the Chinese
Government. A monopoly of longdistance 'rireless communication
was gramted to a. J npanese ooncern
by an agreement signed by the
MiniEtry of Navy in Feibruary,
1918. U'eo.'lnin preferential wireless 1ights were granted to the
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British .Marconi Compa.n y by an
agrN'm<'nt fligned by theJ :Ministry
of War in August 1918, a.nd OOIDfi.nned in a sec nd agreement signPd on l\Iay 24, 1919. Both of
these agreements were viola,t ed by
n contract signed with the
Am<'ricun Federal Wireless Telef!l nph and Telephone CorporatiQ1n
bv the Ministry of Communications, on .TanuaJ.-y 8, 1921. The
project of deve1crping aerial communication in ·China has e.n ded in
a complete fiasco, owing to the
i'Pir.nrf' hy the Chibli a.nd Mukden
militarists, in violatiom. of the
IPrms of ilw agreements with the
Vi.:kf'rs :mel liamlley-Page Chmpnn i CR, of a num l) f'l' of ihe aircraft
impolicd hv Hw Government.
Th<' con,diticlll of the C'hinese
ltoYel'nnwnt railway , to-day, is
rrilif'nl. 'Prndicallv tl1e lrt t constructive art of t11~ :Manchus in
1911 wa'< ihe sig"JJatme of the Hukuang· Railway Loan G\mtract with
the li'OOJil'-Power Group, prv aviding ·
fnr the completion of the OantonITan kc"'-' P..nilway, and the oornRtrnriion of the Rzcchuan-Hankow
line. To rrive effect, to this agree-
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manit it was necessary to na,t ionalize all trunk railways, and it was
the opposit.io·n o£ the Szechuanese
to this action whic.h led to a revolt
in Western China, and ultimately,
to the First Revolution. When
the Manchus were compelled to
abdicate there were· approximately
5,822 miles of ra.i lways, opera.t ed
by the State, by F 'o reign Ooncessionaires, or hy Provinc.ia.l Oompa.nies, ~n China and M·a nchuria.
To-day, more than · eleve•n years
later, the tota.l ha.~ risen only to
1,173 miles ; in o.t her wo·r ds, only
1,353 miles of railway have been
c'ICmpletecl under the R.epublic, or
an a.v erage o.f 123 miles per annum.
THs, of course, is a ridiculous
fig-ure in a country with an area
of over 4,27FI,OOO sq,u a.r e miles,
with a.n e.s timate d population of
n<eaJ:ly 430,000,000, a.nd entirely
devoid of roads. China reqllllires,
and unde•r honest and efficient administration wo'Ulcl derive immense
:fina,n cial ' profit from, many thousands o£ miles o£ railway, linking
up the We te'rn and N orth-westeun
provinces with the Y a.ngtze or the
coast, estrublishing direct com-

munieation by rail between Peking
and O:m ton, and rendoo:ing accessible to world commer100 the
imme·nse na tum] resources o£ proY:imces like Szechuan, Kwan,gsi,
Kweichow, Shensi, Kansu, and
Rinkiang, which a1'e at present eni.imly without railway oommunication. Obhier provinces, such as
Fukien, C'hekiang- a.n d Kiangsi are
·virtually isolated.
A properly run railway is one
o£ the most remunera.t ive UiLidertakings in China. '.Dhe ratio of
expenditure or I'~Netntule o£ the
Peking-Mukden Railway used .t o
be weU below thirty per cent\. As
recently as 1920 it was only 38.75
per cent. And tJ:J.e surplus o£ the
Govetr.'ll.Illent railways fo!r tbt year
ammmted to more than $40,000,000. Jm, 1921 the SUII'plus had
fallen to $27,361,000. Since then
the
Pelring-Hankow
Railway,
which, in 1920, had a surplus of
rubout $15,000,000 has been seized
hy General Wu Pei-fu an,d operat.ed £'0!1." ihci.s p&sonal benefit. 'rhe
Peking-~M:ukden Line ha,s been
split iby General Ohang Tso-lin,
who has can-ied off a large po!l'tion
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or the rolling stork outsid the
G1·eat ·w nll, aJHl operat-es the Shanha.ikuan-1\'Iukden , eclion ent.ireiy
independently of lhe C~ntral Govemment. 0£ the C'antomi-HankOIW
Railway (700 miles) more than 100
of which were completed in 1911,
only 450 miles in ull have beeu
con~tru ted up to date , leaving a
gap o£ 250 mil s in lhe middle and
llto,o.; t d ifllouilt. ·e lion. On the
Northern
(W uciliang-Changsha)
scctio\111 the permanent way and
rolling stock hu,ve deteriorated to
such an extent that it is now considel'ed un afe lo run t.m in s at a
higher peed than eight m·iles per.
ho It?" over portion o£ :the line:..
Cooshuction ()£ the SzechuanHankow TI.ailway has ootirely
cea ·ed, and •u ot ()ne kilometre of
the line is working. The Southern
section of the
anton-Hankow
Rail way still being in the hands o£
a provincial CIOIIllpany, all that
China has to show foT a Loan of
~ix millions t.erliug being some two
hundred miles o£ pe!l'manent way
in such an appalling condition
i.ha.t, as the Ghairman o£ the Han-

kow British Ohamber of ComJillei'Ce
put .it only a few days ago, "we
are in meusumble distance or£ a
complete stoppage."
The Government railways, owing to militar·y depredations and
int.edert!nce a.re all on the verge of
i"ui.n. '1'1H!•y are unable to do more
~ than meet actual working expenses, little or no money being
available for repairs, maintenance,
o·I' additions to roBing-stock.
Money eannarked :for necessary
railway undertakings, such as, the
reconstnwtion o£ the Yellow
River B,ridge ou the I ekingHanko·w Line, is EJhaJUelessly misappropriatea fo1' 11olitical or military use. 'l'he pl1g·h t of the Provincial Railways is equally unsatisfactory. The Kiangsi Rail way i ·
on the verge of bankrupt y, showing a heavy annual deficit, and
getting mol'e deeply into debt every
year with its Japane. e creditors.
The Kwangtung section o£ the
Oanton-Hankow Line has 11,ot been
erx.tended any further Northward
:for years, and i!! losing heavily.·
Tlhe Swatow-Ghaochoufu
Rail-
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way has never paid its way, · anc1
is unlikely to do so in the· near
future. Indeed the only paying
provincial line i.P' the Sunning
Railway, which had a surplus of
a little over $115,000 in 1921. The
only railways which are really on
a ound financial basis to~day are
the -two foreign-owned ()once sions
-the South Manchuria. and the
Yunnan Railways.
How. grave the financial situation of the Chinese Government
railways is was revealed in a series
of resolutions adopted by the American Ohamber of Commerce a.t Peking," at the end of last month.
Theo figures given therein show
that instead o£ paying thei1• loan
obligations and deb~ fo~ materials
an,d equipment, and yielding a
substantial annual sUiplus to the
Governments.
the
Government
Railways and telegraphs shOIW a;n.
annual deficit ou Loan servicetl
alo!D.e {)£ $14,400,000 without making a.ny provision whatsoever for
· t:b.e payment of unsecured indebtedness amounting to $108,800,000.
No re.putable foreign firmswillcon-
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tinue to supply materials~ to the
Government raitlways, on credit,
·u nder present conditions, and it
seems to he merely a question o1
time until some o£ the main lines
either hreak down, or find' it neceso.ary g-reatly tO> reduce theil' passenger and goods services, owing
to the dei.erioration of the per-manent way and ro:lling-stock. J t
is believed that immense damage
has already been done . to the locomotives and rolling-stock cal'ried off by Chang Tso-lin during
his invasion o·f Chihli last yt>ar
fo·r there are no fa.c i[ities for repairs and maintenance outside the
wall. The Chinese object to any
form o£ foreign supervision or control on their State Railways. A
comparison
between
Ghineseoperatecl lines, and those operated
under foreign control should convince any impartial observer that
some fo'l"m. of foreign supervision,
coupled with the complete elimination of military interference, constitutes the sole meanS/ hy which
the Ohinese railway system can be
saved from absotlute disaster.
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VIII.
FINANCE.
T HE Tzuchengyuan, or National
Council, whieh met for the
first time in October, 1910, prepared a Budget for 1911, which
estimated the income of the ·central Government at Kuping Tls.
301,910,296, and the total na.tional
eoxpenditure (including T~s. 77,915,890 for the Army) at Tis.
298,448,365, Qeaving a sm·plus ot
of Tls. 3,461,931. In October la t.
the late Mini ter of Finance published a statement sho•w ing that
lhe expenditure of the. Central
Government was more than $108,000,000 per annum (o£ which
$55,216,462 wa,~ required for the
payment o£ units under the Minisuy of. War, and the Chihli
troop ) and that the annual revenue of the Central Government
was $2,772,000 per annum, lea\'ing a deficit of over $105,000,000.
In the expenditure given above
no account was taken of Ohina's
obligations in connection with foreign and domestic loans, ra.ilway
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or telegraph loans, etc., and t.he
military exependiture was c.onfine.cl to: fourteen Divisions and sixteen, tQ eighteen Mixed Brigades,
or at most 350,000 out of the
1,332,000
men
under
anns
throughout the country.
In
.December 1911 China's foreign indebtedness
including
railway
loans, but exclusive of a few smaU
private loans wa& £138,998,861, or
approximately $1,590,000,000. In
September last China's fo·r eign
and internal debts, exclu ive of
those contracted by the Ministry
o£ Communications, were e timated to amount to $1,726,400,000.
To this must be added approximately
540,000,000 representing
railway an,d telegnph loans, and
unsecured indebtedness' for material, bringing the total up i.o about
$2,265,000,000, an increru e in
the nation's total iude,b tedness in
eleven years o£ over $660,000,000.
This, at first sight does not seem
excessive. But it must •b e emphasized that since 1911 the entire Germa.n and Austrian outstanding portion o£ the Boxer
Indemnity, amounting at the date

,
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o£ cancellati<m to about $'217 ,000,000, has been cancelled, and that
in addition., since 1911, Ohina has
reduced her pre-R.epubllican indebtedness
by
a.pp!'o!Ximately
$500,000,000.
At a conservative
estimate, therdo,r e, without taking
into account repayments of or on
aooount o£ short and long-term
loans contracted under the Republic, the Republican Government
has increased C.hina.'s national indebtedness by over 1,300,000,000.
As a mat.t.er of £act of the $1,726,400,000 which wa the figure give11
by the Minister of Finance of
China's foreign and domestic indebtedness., exclu ive or£ l'a ilway
and telegraph loans, in setpembeT last, more than $953,800,000
had been contracted under the Rep11blic.
Judged by Europ an sta_ndards
a na-tional debt of ahout £'285,000,000 would not be considered
serious · for a country of the size,
and possessed of the immense Iesources, of China. Under efficient
administration there would ihe no
difficulty in meeting alii cilarges
upon this-and indeed upOn a
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considerably
gi'eater-indebtedness. It is difficult, however, io
see how even a bs5inning is to be
made with the necessary financial
reforms. The- OustomSI revenue::.
are pledged for indemnity pa.vments and for the service of a
limited number of domeslic loan .
Such o£ the Salt Revenue as a1e
not appropriated by the militari~; ts
and provincjal a·utthoritie h'a.ve been
pledged over and over again to
tide the Oentral Government over
periodical financial crises.
Tlbc
Central
GGvernment
receive~
practically nothing from the Land
Tax, Likin, vVine and Tobacco
~axes' , and railway revenues. Yet
with an income of $231,000 pei·
month it is expected to find more
than $4,500,000 per month for
miQitary expenses alone, and if :it
succeed in borrowing even a few
million dollars to carry it over a
New Year or other festival, tl1P
militarists commandeer the lion's
share.
Even the metropolitan
police, on whose loyalty the maintenance o:f order in the Oapital depends, have to work month after
month without I'eceiving their pay,
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and have I'ecently been considering going round, cap in l1and, to
beg £rom the Peking populn.liou.
Funds cannot be found for the
Chinese Legations and Consulalt>s
abro<::td, and it is not unusual fo1
a high Chinese offwial, pmc:eeding on some foreign mi ·sion io
have to go to the Inspector-General o£ ustoms or the As ociute
Ins-pector General of the Sa~t Administration, to borrow, on the
G-overnment's accnunt, the comparatively small sum necessary for
his travelling expen es.
The tragedy of the situation is
that the reckless borrowing undt>•'
the Republican regime, for which
the nation will eventually have io
£oot the bill, has brought no benefit to the country at large. The
money has been pent as reokle ·sly as it has been borro·wed. Officials who have held offi.~ in Peking for a few months, or even
a few weeks, and have had their
fing-e•t s in some lo•a n deai , shamelessly flaunt their ill-gotten weal th
in the eyes of the•ii' countrymen.
One can imagine no pa:eca.utio.ns ·
at the momcmt. which could con·
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.ceivuhly ·prove effec.tive in ensuring tha,t any money lent .t01 China
would he used e:xclus.ively for the
reorganiza.tio•n of her finances•.
M. Padoux, one of the Governmeinrts' Foreign AdviserS!, has produced a scheme fo.r the consolidatiOin o,£ Ohina's indelbrtednenss,
,r ailway obliga,t ions e:xclrucled, by
ihe uo>e o·:f the Oustoms surplus,
including the additional yield
.anticipated from the proj ected 2!
pel1 c.e nt. surta.:x'. His scheme has
evoked a strung protest fr'om the
1\.merican Ohambe1r of Oommerc.e in
Peking on the gmulnld tha,t ili
ignores iJhe obligations .orf the Ministry of Communications. Doubtless Ohina's l'ailway debts could
also be oonsolidated and placed
up~m a thoroughly sorund basis, i:f
the railways wm.·e to c.mue~ under
effe1otive fweign supervision, and
all •militaJ."V interferetnlce were eliminated. ·But any scheme· which
prlcwides £orr the payment of Clhina's
fm•eign and domestic (incl!uidingl
rail way) obligations will merely;
tom·c h the fringe o:£ he11.· financ.ial
pl"'oblem. The Government must
},J.a,ve revenue with which' to cany
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on the rout~nte work of th a.dminist.ration. It will need really substantial sums tl::efore any seriou· '
attempt to reorganize the natiJonal
finances can be undertaken. And
if the Gustoons ruvenues were earmarked entirely for the payment
o£ ('hi~a' s fo·r·e·i gn and domesti '
debts , and the1 milwa.y revenuet.
wer to be used , not for the upkeep
orf th'e JHovinc.ial a1mies but solely
for the disch.arr"ge o£ the obligations o£ the U~nistry otf Communications, the militarists would
naturally look elsewhere for the
mea.ns to support themselves a.nd
their forces.
They appropria.ted
more ilhia n a third of th~ Salt revenues in 1922. They wcmild probably seize the remaining two-thirds
if other sources werr··e out otff. We
invariatb ly come 1back to the plain
fact that little or nothing can be
achieved towards the rehabilitation
of China, jn a.ny dii·ect.ion, a long
as th~; Tu,·huns rema.in micontrolJed !!lid uncontrollable.
vV1he1n, if ever, the Special Conference provided for under the
·w aRhington Tlreatie: t()i considerth conditions to be attaobled to the
levy of the 2! per cent. surta.x: on

G3
the Impo·rt Duty, and plans for the
abolition of likin, as embles, it is
difficult to see how it can confine
its discussi01n within the strict
scope of the Oustoms Tariff Trea,t y.
It will, it seems t01 us, be compelled to go into the whole problem
of Chinn.'s finance, and to make any
recommendations which it has to
offeo: for the fulfilment of the
Treaty conditional upon dra tic intf'rnn.l refOTms. Whether it will
bf) able to apply sufficient moral or
finamiCial pressure :to bring iJbJe militarists to iheir senses must, however, he c.on,·idered very doulbtful.
'rhe 'l'uchun. seem to be absolutely
indifff'rent I'eg-arding China's prestige abroad. They care· nothing for
her Treaty engagements, and less
for the protests of. their own coun,
trymP.n. The nm'ancial MocJmde
which has been ma.intai1Jed hy the
Consortium has so fal1' resulted only
in iheir absorbing a. greater and
greater shate of iJhle national
revenues, regardless of the difficulties of the Clentral Go!Vemment. And one ca.n not suggest how
that blockade can be raised with-
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out the certainty tha.t a latrge per·
eentag-e of any moneys lent to
China. for any purpose whatsoever
will find its way, immediately, into
ihe 'l'uchnus' pockert:s.

IX
OPIUM.
CHINESE wTiters have been
fond of citing the AngloChine8e Opium Agreements of
1907 and 1911 as precedents for
the abolition o:l1 extraten:ito1ia.lit.y.
All that it i.s n ecessary to do, they
say, is to put Q.hina upon her
honour, and all will be well. One
o£ the most brilliant of tlw
younger Chinese diplomats , in a
work published as recently as 19] 8
-China's New Const1'ttttion. anrf
International P1·oulems, by M. •r.
Z. Tyau - argue:s· that putting the
Chinese on their honour to fulfil
their obligations in rega.r d to the
abolition
of extrater1itoriality,
would furni ·h the Ghinese people
with a powerful in pirat.i on. He
quotes with app.rorval , the vierws of
the late Sir Robert Hart, that j£
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China "so to speak" were placed
upon her honour, "the whole
force o£ Chinese thought aml
teaching would then be' enlisted
in the foreigner's favour. Such a
cha.n ge o£ pxinciple in the makingof treaties would widen and not
re trict the field £or both merchant
and missionary, would do away
with il'l'itating ]Jrivileges and place
native and ioreigner on the sa.me
footing, a~d wo·uld remove tlle
sting of hummiation a.n d put the
government of China on the sa.me
plane as o1 her governments. u,e tore jurisdiction (to the Chinese)
and the feeling o£ the respon ibility to protect as· well as the appreciation o£ (foreign) intercourse
will at once move up to a higher
pla.n e." Dr. Tyau in this and other
o·f his writings on China mentions
the anti-opium c;ampaign as a
proo£ of what China can arhiew
when plar.ed upon her honour.
Nit· Hobert Hart was writing
just after the Boxer outbreak and
few of our rearlerSJ . who lived iu
China at that time would have
been, prepared to endorse his views
even then. Dr. 'fyau who has
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tnade use o£ his arguments se~etl•
teen years later, appeals £or Gliina
to be judged by her ariti-opium
campaign. By it, then, le-t her
be judged!
An Anti-Opium Edict issued in
1906 ordered the entire abolition of
opium-smoking within ten years
from January 1, 1907. At that
time China was importing over
th1 ee thousand tons o£ foreign
opium per annum, ehiefty from
India. ObviouRly t.h e anti-opium
campaign could not succeed if
tlwusa.ncls o£ tollS o:£ the drug oontinued to come in. from abroad. 1t
'TU S
equally obviotlS that the
~uccess of a cumpaign to suppress
a deeply-rooted habit among the
Ghinese peopil e, even i£ the importation, of foreign opium ceased,
would b in doubt. 'l'he value of
the foreign opime: trade amounb~ ti
lo milliolls of pound sterling per
annum, and even though seriou.
mo·r al issues were involved., the
(-:lovennnent of India ··ottid harcllv
be expected forthwith to sacrifie'e
this immense revenue If the O'ltly
result would he increased opiun1
cultivation in China. Tlhe Briti;;h
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and Chinese Governments therefore entered into an agreement for
a probationary period of three
yeal.'s, under which the export ot
opium from India to Cihina. would
be redueed by 5,100 chests. per
annum, o•r ten per rent., of the
total Indian expo_rt to this country; China., on h r part, engaging
that native production would he
reduced in the' same ratio. This
arrangement proving satisfactory
was. extended in 1911, with th~
object of bringing about the complete extin ction of the Indian
opium tra.de by the end of 1917.
Arrangement.s were also made fo1
the ces. ation of the import of In ·
dian opium inio any province'
which could establish by c!lear
evidence "that it hM effectively
suppres ed the cultivation and imporrt o·f native opium." Agajn the
experiment of putting China, up011
her mettle seemed to be justified,
and though, subsequent to the
He,olution, the term. of the serond
Anglo-Chinese
agreement were
frequently violated by the Provincial Autho·r ities, the anti-Opium
movement rna le such progress
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that £r01m April 1913 the. Indian
Governme~t suspended sales ot
certificated opium £or the hinese
market. :U"rom that elate, therefore, the import o:f Indian opmm
into China became illegal.
As long as the Oent.ral Goverr.ment. possessed a vestige ot autboriiy over tl1 e "ProvinceR, , incere, atn·d
on the whole e!Tedive, measul'PK
were adopted to SU}Jpl'esl'l> ilw
cultivation of, and traffic in,
opium. But :from 19'17 onward:-<
the situation ha~ steadily grown
worse. One provinc.e• attei' another
has been added to the liRt ot
backsliders, and today there is not
a Province or Territory o£ Chin:t
with the possible exception ot
Shansi . in which :my sr,1·ious attempt is made hy the local :mthoriLies to suppress th o-pium haff,,•_
In many o£ i.he · Province. tlJe
poppy is: now cultivated unJer the
protection, i£ not unJer the order;;,
o£ tllf' T 1uchuns and the•ir subordinates. Opium is produced in
and exported_ £rom the Vl estern
and Southweste.tn provinces by the
ton. So general and so lucrati ,,e
is the tr;:tffi • that a11 attempts 1o
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cope with its revival have proved
futile. A mere fraction of t h r
smuggled. drug is seized in the
para.tively few Treaty Ports where
'the Maritime Gustoms £unctions.
Mo1'e t.b,an sixty-six tons of opium
weTl• seized by the C:nstoms Aut.h oritiPs in 1921, and upward, nf
thi1ty tons. in 1922. Th Criminal
Code prescribes severe penrlliti!'S
fot the pr'Odu.rtion, tJ·ans1wrt,, sale
or consumption o1 opium. The
President from, time to' time issues
strong- Manda.t es ordering the complete suppression o·f opium. But
no-OltP, tu];:e · anv notic:e'.
The
traffic. has revived and is in a
flourishing
condition.
Comparatively few Chinese seem to £eel
that there is anything dishonoural:Jle or humiliating in enteriu~
into solemn engagement
with
G1·eat Britain for the cessation of
the lucrative Indo-Chinese Cl·p ium
trade, and reviving the produdi.on
of, and traffic. in, Chinese opium,
within a few yea1 o£ the expilation of the· Anglo-Chinese opium
agreemen~.

Nati nal honour, we were told,
wnulJ pmv a mor pow rful in.
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spiration e:ven tlulllli Treaty stipula~
tion s. No-one can serioosly credit
that statement to-clay. For there
is little sig'll of any ~atim:ia,l sentiment against the reviva,l of o;pium
smoking. It is difficult to enlist
c rrlin ese sympathies with the
activities of the Inter:r1ational
.Anii-Opium .Ass01eiation and its
bra.nches. \Vth at• work has been
ruchieved in the direction of restricting the even mure dangeroos and
insidious morphia t.raffic has be.en
done almost entirely by foreigners.
Practically the omly in:B.uential
voice raiserl against the opium
traffic to-day is that ot the In~
ternational ·Anti-Opium Associntion of Peking. in the activities of
which few Chi nllse now take an;y
Herious inteJ.'est, and whio'h', in
our opinion devotes fa.r too much
of its ene•r gies' to critici m of
wha.t is occurring outside China.
'At the moment an alleged, a1nd in
our belief entirely impracticable!
Japanese scheme for .an op:iulm
mCinopoly is a.Urad.ing ('.Onsiderable
attention:. If, ns is quite possible,
r elegn..lization of t.he opium traffic
!ol' a limited pe1'iod proves to be ths
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only means of restm'ing CQllitrol
over the pi'olluction and oousumption of the llrug, the la ·t }Je1·son.s
to whom the opel'ation of the
monopoly should he entrusted arc
an iiTesponsible Japanese grom.p,
who e proposals have been repudiated by the .Tapanes3 I_.egation,
n~u.d ~~~hose ma.in punJose appears to
be to create security ior the Iepa,vmcnt of existing and future Japane. e Loans.
An opium monopoly for a limited period o[ years under r ·ponsibJa
foi 'e ign supervision ma.y eve•nt.ually
provtl to be the only practicable
Aolut.ion of Ohina's ol'ium pr1'10!blem:.
Bu1t the whole que tion will demand handling with extreme care.
T'he est.ablishment of such a monopoly would constitute a serious
breach of China's internationaL
engagem~nts, and eould only be
justified i£ satisfactory guarante
were produced that it w10tuld be n.
step towards the abolition, and not
towards the permanent revival, o£
the opium traffic. And it would,
in our opinion, be essential that iJl1e
revem1es derived therefrom be
earmarked £or some urgent nation-
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al need, such as the disbandment.
()f troops. The view has frequently been expressed in these oolumns
that the problems of clis.balrudment
and the suppression of opi1u1m are
so closely interrelated that they
must be dealt with simultaneously
if any satisfactory solution is to be
found. I£ tba.t view is correct the
idea of allowing a Japanese
:fi11a.n cial syndicate to exploit the
opium haffic for the advantage of
itself or its nationals must be sum' ma1ily reject€d.

X.
'l'HE MEJWUANT OLAS. '.

WE have glanced rapidly, but we
hope not unfairly, over the
outstanding features of Ohina's
present adm~ntistrative chaQs. We
now turn to another side o£ the
lJicture..
Although since 1911
China has been almos.t CQll'tinuously racked by civil war and internal
dissension ~h1e gro s value of he1·
foreign tratle inc1·ea ed from Hk.
'1'1 . 870,986,477 iu 1911 ro Hk.
Tls. 1,560,833,178 in 1921. The

73
i.rxl'ease has hoon mainly in imports, which have more than doubled during the period refened to.
There has unquestiona,h ly, since
the establishment of t.he ltepublic,
been a greatly inm·eased dtJill1.and
for foreign machinery of every
kind.
The import of eloot.rical
machinery and a,p paratus in 1921
was nearly ten times as great in
value as tha.t i.nl 1911. And the import of other kinds o£ machinery
has shown as grea.t an, if not a
greater, increase. Factories equipped with mode1m· machinery ha;ve
been springing up all over the
country. The industries of the
oountry have expanded to a phenomenal extent.
A'nd the war,
which shn,t off many world markets
from their usual sources of supply
stimulated exports of raw and
manufactured materials for which
Ohiina. had neve·r previously been
in the ma.r ket,.
In view of the diffiawlties and
un certainty under which trade has
been conducted in C:hina. this great
expansion in t.ra.de and industry
argues extra.orrdinary persistence
!lnd entel.'prise on the part of her
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citizens. It must be considered unfortunate that the Ohinese merchant claS>S, while capa,ble of rema:nka ble p·e rseverance in the colllduc.t of trade and industry under
the most adverse conditians, does
not displa.y the same q)u.alities in
politics. A handful of tm1bulent
1u1d undisciplined students will intimidate iihe merchants of a whole
city into participation in a, boycott
or other movement with which iu
their hearts, few or any of them
a.pprove. Similarly, the merchants
!mbmit without am.y eerious attempt
at resistance to the e:x:ac.tions and
oppression of the militarists, year
a.f ter year. They permit themselves
to be blackmailed into making
huge and illegal "contributions"
towards the support of armies
which they know, only too well,
constitute a. serious menace to their
interes,ts. In enterprises olf a.n
official or semi-official characte11· in
which. thev are invited to cooperate, or·offer their co-opelration,
they seem inca,pa.ble of excluding
volitical influences, with all the inefflcieucy and corrupholll which
their intrusion entails. As an O'r-

ganized body they hiave hitherto
ab ·ta.ined from entering ~nrto
politic ·, leaving the field clear to
the professional politicians, o:t
whose unworthiness the present
Parliament gives fresh1 proofs almost daily.
The passivity of the Chinese
metch:mt c.la,ss is the mpst discoUI·aging feain.11re orf the present
situation.
Only on very ra;re
oc.casiolns will they stand up for
their rights, and hy concerted
action, force the local authorities,
or thie Central GoJVernment. to give
heed to their views. In political
matters they seem to be swayed by
any p•laUS>i•b le charlat:m, or even by
a m01b orf half-educated schoolboys. They will usually follow the
line of least resistance, though experience oll.lg-ht by this. time to have
convinced them that it would pay,
in the lointg run. to oppose movements in whjc:h ifuey nave no faith,
with whicn tb.ev have no real svmpathy, and which must inevi~,bly
fa.il to achieve any useful purpose.
The O!llly real holpe o£ the nation
at the moment is the entry into
politics of the Ohincl>~ mercihant
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class. It s.eemed, but a few m01nths
ago, that the Ohinese Chambers o£
Oommell'Ce had been really roosed
by the pretensions and maladmin- ·
istrahon o£ the militarists, and
that a. nation-wide anti-militarist
campaign might result. Blult the
movement already seems to haYe
died down. And the merchants,
~nsteacl of repudiating Paa:liamemt
and its absurdities>, to-day seem
willing ta allo•w theiiilselves once
again to be exploited by politicians
and tudents in a campaign whidhi
cannot bring any good to their
country, and can onJy result in
friction with Japan .
The only really constructive
effort emanating from the merchant
class under the Republic has been
the/ foi,mation o£ the Chinese Banking Group, which u!ndertoo~c to
financ{) the needs o£ the Gorvernment Railway$, and the construction of the Shang•hJa.i :M::int. The
Government. Railways have beem
sei,e.d, and operated for their own
benefit, by the militarist without
any effective protest. The Shanghai Mint still remains unequipped,
bcca.us~ the funds necessary to pa.y

for the machinery which has
already been imported, a,:re not
a.vail'able. And even if the plant
were installed the real purpose of
the Mint-tihe substitlu1tilon of the
dollar :for the tael as the uon,it oi£
national omTency--would not be
achieved, for the proposals of the
.FoYrign Excha,n ge Bank~, whose
co-operation would be es entia} to
make the project a suecess, have
been ignoi'ed.
The il·ut.h seems to be that,
shrewd and enterprising us the
Chinese nlC!rchaJJt a:nd hanker may
bfl as an individual, collectively
they are inca.p able of efficient or
conRh uctive effort. Thiey will selclom adopt u. definite po.Jicy ana
pursue it, regardless of the consrqueuces. They almost invaria.b ly
prefer indir ct, and therefore unf:a tisfactory, means o£ workimg· :for
1.h rir 11articular ends. 'fhe merc·hanis at 'rsingtn.o, if .J a pane e
were in league with the bandits a
was alleged, could have put the
Japanese Authtoii'itie' entir•e ly in
tlw wmng at the iime of rendition,
b.y pu,blicly 1·evealing their appi·ehensions, rund calling upon t"Qe
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Japanese, and later, the Clhinese,
auiih'orities- to adopt effective preca•u tions.
Instead of that they
feasted and attempted ~o bri!be the
bandits, with the- result that an
attempt was made to blackmail
them beyond their capacity to pay,
so that every Ohinese merchant of
any prominence had to g01 iJillt(ll hiding or leave the city. In the
Chinese Hace C'lu.b of Chihli we
hia.ve yet another example of the
difficulty o£ secm•ing harmonious
co-operatiOlD. among the Ghinese
merchants.
'l'he recent trouble
fleems to have been due to the
attempt on the paJ't of .cine o~ more
of the promoters of the enterprise
to remove from the Committee a
member of whose conduct they diJ
not appro>e. In:;tead o£ oppo ing
the unJrovular committee-man openly, one of hi~ opponents appears to
have invoked the aid of the Provincial Assembly, which passed a
law prohibiting gam:b Hng. I£ this
law remai'Ils in force the days od'
the Race Club will be numbered,
for t.he Chinese take little or no ·
intere t in racing apart from its
gambling features,

I
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1£ China's merchants, as a body,
could be induced to devote :to the
interest'>' of their comntry a mere
hadion of the persistooce, shrewdness .a.nd business capacity which
they disp1a.y in connec.t.ion with
theci.r own interests, it woruld not
he long ibefore there was a. radica.l
chlange in the political outlook. As
long as they submit withorut otpposition to the preten. ions of militarists, politiciams and school-~l.;oys,
little or 110 improvement in conditions in this country can be expectml.
XI.
PrOSSIBILI'ffiES.

JT is

cu. tomary to wM'n those
who become impatient in ICgard to the administrative ohao"
in this country tha.t the political
trans:f.ol'mat.ion o£ a nation of upwa.r ds of -foul" hundred millions of
people is a prooess which cannot
reas<mably be expected to be curried thro·u gh, successfully, in the
course oi a ferw year& ; that pre-
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vwus revolutions, m• change:;' in
. dynasty in hiua. have bee;u followed' by many years o£ comple1e
disorganization ; and that, left
alone, and guarunteeu agaiusl
foreign aggre sion, tho Ghinese
Republic wiill pro•b ably develop
into a stable and satisfac.to•r y system of G overnm(mt. There i:; coHsiderabl e force in some of the;;o
arguments. But it must no,t be
forgotten that the network o:£ te]egraphs throughout the country,
and the development o:£ railway
and postal communications, ha:v~
removed one of the main obstacles
to the rapid solution of China's
administrative problems. peking
knows, to-day, what happened in
Canton, ye-sterday, a.u d vice versa.
Thousands of newspapers in all
parts of the eount.ry keep the reaJing public moi'e or les accurately
informed: of what is happening in
different parts o£ China, and in
foreign lands. H, as its supporters maintain, the country is rea 1ly ripe for, and in fa.vom· of, republic~nism, some progress ought
to be percept.iblle after eleven year:;
of political tmmoil.
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We doubt whether history can
a single instanc.e in whi<"h
a country where the percentage of
illitera<:y is as high as in China
has made a success o·f Republican
Government.
The word "republi c" nnd the theol'ies o£ democratic
gorvernment, appear to have dominated the minds o£ Ghina's
politicians, to the exclusion o£ all
practical considerations, since the
First Revolution. China was not
ripe for republicanism in 1911;
she is not ripe £or it to-day; and
we do not believe it po sible for
her to become a Republic in aught
but name within the next century.
It was hoped by the MaJlchu GoYernment- whic.h p1esuruably had
reliable jJJ:£ormation on which to
ba e it plans-tha.t at the endl n r
the seventh year of the njne-year
f•onstitutional programme, one per
cent.. o,f the populat,i on would ht•
alJle to 1·ead and WJite!
The
Dynasty was overtJno-wn at the
end o£ the fourth yea1·. It is ditftcult to believe that this pe•r centng-e of literacy has yet been attained. A Manchu autocracy has been
succ.eeded by a militarist oligarchy,
~how
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~

eaoh member o£ which pla.ys only
fo·r his own hand, and treats the
so-called Government with contempt. An election, even on the
1·estricted franchise. adopted in
1912, which! will give Ohina a
Parliament realll y representa.t ive of
the enhanchised classes, is out o£
the question, under existing conditio'll,s. And a P'axliament composed of the Tuchuns' nominee~,
andl o£ rrofe>:sional politician who
have bought their seats, is a hindrance, not a help, to the administm~ion, and an insuperable obstacle to , table and satisfac.torv
foreign reluJions.
·
It is impossible t01 predict, w1tn
any certainty, what. the fuhne
will bring forth. T!here i." alway:-~
the possibility, o£ course, that one
or other of China's ambitious milttaiists will beat down or intimidate a!ll his. rival , and, £or' a briel
spell dominate the country af'
Di tator, Emperor, or pseudoPresident.
Such a development
would, in our opinion, be unlikely
to pl"oiVide a. permanent solution ot
Clhina's problem, for no S<>oner
ha.d one ambitious militarisrt e<l-
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tahlished his ascendancy than
others. wouldl conspir•e to overthrow
him, and it would be merely a
question of time befo1'e wha.t was
gained by t.h e sword, by the sword
was overthrown.
If it be assumed, as we think
it mus·t be assumed, that a really
republican goven1ment, "broadbased uporn the people's wiU," is
outside the scope of practical
politics, and a militaTy dictatorship, by whomevel' assumed, will
be ephemeral and merely serve to
perpetuate internal st1-ife, only
one other olution, which offers
any hope o·f an early improrvement,
reunification of the country, and
orderly political evolution, can be
regarded as feasible-a constitutional monarchy. This was' the
solution favoured! by many competent o•b servers in 1912. It remains a po siblle, though not au
·easy, solution to-day. The idea oJ
restoring the Manchu Dyna ·ty t n
the Throne-and as far as orne can
·ee there is no othe1• possible comse
if monarchical gorvernment is retored-would be certain to arou&e
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furious
an'd
no~sy
oppositiou
among- the p1·o£ession al }Joli licians
who tint! pscuclo-republic:lllism o·ffers so favourable a. field for grafL
and intrigue. A Manchu Iestoration, however, would, if it. offered
any reasona.hle prospect o.f peace
and administ.r ati ve stability, commend itself liolh to• the mer ·ha11 L
cla·s, and · to the Chinese ma se",
throughout the greater paJ.'t o£ the
countr'Y. There might be se1ious
opposition in some of the So·u theru
ptovinces, but even in South China
the people. must be weary of incessant. strife, and inclined, to-day, to
acce•p t any solution which seems
The
likely 1o ~ead to peace.
most important factor woold be the
attitude of the militarists. Would
they accept the authority of the ·
Emperor, and accept it not as a
matter merely of lip-service ?
There is reason to believe that
many o£ them are monarchists at
heart, and that their opposition to •
the coup o•£ 191 I was due not to
any question o£ principle, but to
jealom y of General Chang Hsun,
bv whom that coup was carried
o~t. In the event of a mon,arcl:Iical
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restoration, accoon panied by pledge of. their support, their vanity
would probably be fiatteil'ed by the
CIOI!lferment of hereditary titles,
and the cnnfirma.tion of .t heir positiO<niS as Viceroys or Governors of
the Provinces over whic.h , a.t present, they h:we control. One could
not expect, nor WIOittlcl one desire,
the Monarrhy, if restored, to revert
to the absolute autocracy of prerevolution days, though it would
be necessary, i:f any real imprO<Vement were to be effected, for t.h e
Imperial authority over the provincial satraps to be, in a very large
measure, re-established. It wo·ulrl
be ne essary, also, to aoolis'bl the
present Parliament, and to mrganize a legislature more representative of the na.tiorn, in which,
as in the old Tzuohengyuan, a
balance would be maintained between selected and elected members. And to make government
practicruhle at all, wide powers
would have to be conferred upon
the Executive. Administrative reform, and the condu:c.t of Ohina' s
foreign relatic'D.s aJ"e alike impo sible when Pa.rliamen,t claims a-n1d

.I
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a.Hempts to exercise thE! power o£
embarrassing the Executive at
every turn.
A Constitutional Monarchy seems
to offer the best hope of stall::le govemment in Ohina.. If, however,
for one reason m· auort:her a restoration proves impos ible in the near
future, it may be wga.r ded as
virtually certain that the Chihli
Party will proceed with its plans
for ejecting President Li Yuanhung, and installing General Tsao
Kunin his place. That this would
a.rouse as much, if not more, opposition throughout the SoUJt.h than a
M:.anchu restoration, goe withorut
sr..ying. Tsao Kun has a.bsolrurtely
no claims to the Presidency exceyt
the ±act that his militru'Y and
political adherents hope, by installing him, to further their own interests. It i doubrtful whether
he, himself, aspires t.o the Presidency. No really representative
legislature would accord him a fractiolll .o.f the votes necessary to
seclllre hi~ "ele-ction." He would
retain the position only for so lolllg
as the militarv forces under his
own and hi 'H; bordin.ates' oollltrol
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were a1ble to de.f eat 0 1r to intimidate
his C')Jpoments. No-one acquainted
with his record can seriou ly suppose that he i:- China's ''man oi'
destinv.''
'rhe fact that there
should be all this scheming and
c.onspiring tv substitute him for
P'residr.nt J,j Yuan-hung is, perhap,c;, the most conclusive p~oo£ ihat
repuhlicaJJism, as the wmd is genrmlly understood, does not exist in
China. In a c.oruntry wherre the
choice of its Ghief E,x ecutive rested
with the people, General Tsao
Kun's nnme would never even
appear on the list oi' candida,tes for
1lw Presi.lcmcy.

